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The Americans with Disabilities Act:




Today's culture is obsessed with "family values,"1 with at-
tempting to define a family2 narrowly and with establishing who
can or should be a parent.3 The debate is painfully familiar to
physically disabled individuals whose right to be parents has been
consistently denied and restricted4 even as technology has devel-
oped to assist disabled living.5 Ignorance of and fears about the
disabled still bar them from the basic societal function of raising a
family.6
The specific problem for physically disabled parents is that no
social service agency ("social services") program in the nation pro-
* Julie S. Odegard graduated from Columbia College, Columbia University,
N.Y., N.Y., in 1991 with a psychology major/English concentration; University of
Minnesota Law School, J.D. expected May 1994.
1. Additional sources: Jerry Z. Muller, Classic Liberals Knew Their Value,
PHOENIX GAZETTE, Oct. 13, 1992, at All; Jonathan Yardley, No Bargains, Just Big-
otry in the Current Cant of Family Values, WASH. PosT, Sept. 14, 1992, at D2. "Fam-
ily values" has a multitude of definitions and connotations. The phrase is frequently
associated with the following: stay-at-home mothers; motherhood, single mother-
hood, families; parental responsibility for children; social structure, discipline, and
standards of behavior; religion; and politics. See Irving Kristol, 'Family Values' - Not
a Political Issue, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1992, at A14; Edward Walsh, Clinton Stance
Bolsters Growing Crusade to Enforce Child Support, WASH. PosT, Jan. 3, 1993, at
A3.
2. "Family" is defined variously as a household (a group of individuals living
under one roof); a nuclear family (two or more adults living together and caring for
their children); a clan; and a race. Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(1986). This article refers to the common definition of family: parent(s) and adopted
or natural child.
3. By "parent" I refer to both the identity (a natural or adoptive father or
mother of a child) and the caregiving functions of a parent to a child. See Webster's
Third New International Dictionary (1986).
4. See Rick Pluta, Family Rights Next Wave in Handicapper Rights War, Pro-
prietary to UPI, August 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; See Garry
Abrams, Parents Without Power, L.A. TiMES, July 26, 1992, at E7.
5. Pluta, supra note 4; Jay Mathews, Custody Battle the Disabled Fight to Raise.
Their Children, WASH. PosT, Aug. 18, 1992, at Z1O.
6. See Mathews, supra note 5, at Z10.
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vides attendant service7 to assist physically disabled parents in car-
ing for their healthy children during the childhood years.S
Although social services will assist disabled adults with home care
directed toward the disabled individual, they will not assist with
child care. 9 As a result, physically disabled parents who cannot af-
ford to hire a private attendant have no access to attendant child
care services. Social services' and the courts' consistent response to
this problem has been to label physically disabled parents as "unfit"
and to terminate their legal rights as parents.O
Individuals such as Tiffany Callo," a mother with cerebral
palsy, have gained media attention by demanding a federal right to
support services while raising their children.12 The state took
away Callo's two children because it believed her physical disability
made her an "unfit" parent.13 In Callo's case, law and society ig-
nored her fundamental right to be a parent.14 The courts' restric-
tive definition of "family" forced Tiffany Callo to create a separate
model of the family that includes families headed by physically dis-
abled parents. Callo's model extends the "family values" public pol-
icy protections to physically disabled parents by recognizing their
federal right to child care assistance.
Increasingly, physically disabled individuals are starting fam-
ilies.15 Yet they still fear the consequence of the state taking away
their children.' 6 Their invisibility has resulted in lack of a political
7. Attendant service provides a physically disabled adult with public funds to
hire an attendant to help him/her perform physical tasks. Mathews, supra note 5, at
Z1O, Z12.
8. Pluta, supra note 4.
9. Ruth Richman, A Family Pulled Apart: Disabled Mother Struggles With the
Pain of Losing Two Children, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13, 1992, at 3.
10. See Abrams, supra note 4, at E7.
11. Tiffany Callo's biography describes her struggles with the Santa Clara
County Department of Social Services and California courts to regain custody of her
two sons. JAY MATHEws, A MOTIER's ToucH: THE TwFANY CALLO STORY (1992)
[hereinafter TIFFANY CALLO STORY].
12. Individuals such as Leigh and William Earl, a physically disabled couple,
argue that the Americans with Disabilities Act family preservation provisions man-
date support services such as attendant care. Aileen Streng, Disabled Couple to Tes-
tify About Raising a Child, GANN=TT NEWS SERVICE, August 7, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library.
13. In her biography, Tiffany Callo states that the state's evidence that she was
an "unfit parent" mentally and psychologically was a pretext for disability discrimi-
nation. TIFFANY CALLO STORY, supra note 11, at 179; Streng, supra note 12.
14. In re KL.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279 (Alaska 1991)(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); See also In re Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 900 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992).
15. See Pluta, supra note 4; Mathews, supra note 5, at Z10; Torri Minton,
They're Just Plain Mommy and Daddy, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, March 6, 1991,
at B3.
16. See Mathews, supra note 5, at Z10.
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voice. 17 No public policy has developed on the issue of physically
disabled parenting, and these parents have been politically power-
less when states move to terminate their parental rights.' 8
This article argues that this powerlessness ended with the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).'s The ADA
prohibits public and private entities from discriminating on the ba-
sis of disability in areas such as employment, housing, and trans-
portation. The ADA has rapidly accelerated the process of
mainstreaming2O the disabled into social and economic life. Main-
streaming under the ADA focuses primarily on giving the disabled
equal access to employment and commerce by prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination and providing transportation and physical ac-
cess to businesses.21 This article argues that the ADA mandates
equal access to the fundamental right of parenting. It imposes a
clear duty on states to provide social services to disabled parents
and eliminate the crises that families headed by physically disabled
individuals face in trying to stay together.
Part one of this article describes family law as applied to phys-
ically disabled parents: parental rights termination proceedings
and their discriminatory treatment of physically disabled parents.
Part two focuses on the ADA's "enabling" impact on physically dis-
abled parents: extending family values protection to physically dis-
abled individuals enables them to parent as effectively as non-
disabled individuals. It will demonstrate that physically disabled
parents have a federal cause of action under the ADA for support
services which will give the physically disabled an equal opportu-
nity to be parents, not just employees and customers.
17. Judy Jones, Children Suffer As They Care For Disabled Parents, INDEPEND-
mEr, May 8, 1992, at 7.
18. Pluta, supra note 4.
19. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991).
20. Both state and federal governments today pursue the goal of total integra-
tion of the disabled into the mainstream, i.e., the social and economic life of society.
In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 44 (Cal. 1979). Two groups have dominated
the disabled rights movement. One group, the independence movement, felt that
"disabled people could become most active and creative if they augmented their abili-
ties with helpful methods and machines like signing and wheelchairs, even if this
might aggravate popular prejudice against them and isolate them in some ways from
nondisabled society." TiFFANY CALLO SToRY, supra note 11, at 141. The other group,
the mainstream movement, advocated that the disabled try to walk or learn to
speak, no matter what the price in time and energy, and "behave like nondisabled
people as much as possible or be denied social status and productive employment.'
Id.
21. The ADA is composed of five titles addressing disability discrimination in the
areas of employment (Title I), public services including public transportation (Title
II), public accomodations (Title III), telecommunications (Title IV), and miscellane-
ous provisions in Title V. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991).
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Part One: The Status Quo
A. Termination of Parental Rights
The Americans with Disabilities Act's impact on physically
disabled parents can only be understood in the context of physically
disabled parents' existing legal rights. Termination statutes gov-
ern states' abilities to terminate parents' rights to their children.
The legislative standards and procedures for termination vary
across jurisdictions.22 Various judicial interpretations of termina-
tion statutes have perpetuated termination proceedings' discrimi-
natory impact on physically disabled parents.
General Overview
Involuntary termination of parental rights may be the state's
most severe interference with the family relationship. 23 Although
termination statutes vary across jurisdictions, some typical charac-
teristics exist. The statutes uniformly provide vague criteria or
grounds for termination which allow for considerable judicial dis-
cretion.24 The Supreme Court has provided two general guidelines,
however, for termination proceedings. First, the Court has held
that the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause does not require
the appointment of counsel to represent poor parents in termina-
tion proceedings. 25 Second, the state must prove its allegations of
neglect with clear and convincing evidence.26
Because termination statutes vary, this article will use Cali-
fornia's statute27 to illustrate some of the typical characteristics of
the termination proceeding as well as that state's unique approach.
California's statute is the result of recent reforms to provide a more
explicit and narrow basis for state intervention and better reunifi-
cation and protective services. 28 The reformed statute is the result
22. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND NE-
GLECT LITIGATION 242 (1981) (hereinafter CHILD ABUSE).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
26. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982). The Court required clear and
convincing evidence when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are
both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money'" (quot-
ing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).
27. CAL. [WELF. & INST.] CODE § 366.26 (West Supp. 1993).
28. In In re Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), a California
Court of Appeals noted that the changes brought about by the reforms fell into three
categories: "(1) providing more explicit and restrictive basis for juvenile court inter-
vention; (2) requiring clearly focused protective and reunification services, and (3)
providing permanency planning at the earliest stage for these children who cannot
live safely with their families." Id. at 893.
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of concerns arising from interpretations of vague statutes that gov-
ern termination proceedings. 29
Across jurisdictions, children enter the juvenile dependency
system when a parent either voluntarily gives social services tem-
porary custody of a child or, frequently, when the state intervenes
against the parent's will.30 According to California's statute, a
county social worker must have a reasonable belief that the child is
in some "danger" before taking a child into temporary custody.3 '
The statute defines danger to a child as an immediate need for med-
ical care, immediate danger of physical or sexual abuse, and imme-
diate threat to the child's health or safety.32 Across jurisdictions,
statutes also grant courts broad discretion in terminating parental
rights on the basis of "neglect."33 Courts have interpreted parental
physical disability both as a factor in and an embodiment of neglect,
creating a tenuous and uncertain legal status for parents with
physical disabilities.
California's statute requires that the agency consider whether
there are any "reasonable services" 34 that would circumvent such
action before taking a child into temporary custody. If so, it must
provide those services to the family.35 The "reasonable" and "avail-
able" factors allow courts to limit the extent to which social services
must seek out alternative support services. 36 Once courts define
the agency's responsibility, the state files a dependency petition
which triggers a prompt detention hearing in juvenile court.37 At
this hearing, the state must make a prima facie case showing that
29. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894.
30. Id. Any person, however, may file a complaint alleging a child's abuse or
neglect with a social service agency. CHILD ABUSE, supra note 22, at 44.
31. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894.
32. Id.
33. A typical termination statute states the following as reasons for state
intervention:
[tihe repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, con-
trol or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and
the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522, 523 (Pa. 1990). See also In re E.M, 584 A.2d 1014, 1018
(Pa. 1991); In re Jacobs, 444 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Mich. 1989); UNW. ADOPTION AcT
§ 19(c). 9 U.L.A. (pt I) (1988).
34. Reasonable services are forms of assistance that agencies give to a parent to
enable the parent to maintain custody of his/her child. A reasonable service might
be helping a physically disabled parent find housing.
35. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
36. Courts accept the argument that since the service of 24 hour assistance is not
"available" in any state it is not "reasonable," and the state consequently has no duty
to provide that service. See In re P.M., 581 N.E.2d 720, 721 (Ill. App. 1991); See also
infra note 92.
37. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
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the child is in danger or the court will release the child to the par-
ent's custody. 38 The court must consider whether social services
made reasonable efforts to prevent removing the child in the first
place and, if not, whether social services is in a position to provide
the services necessary to restore parental custody.39 If the court
maintains temporary custody, it must order reunification serv-
ices, 40 if appropriate. 41 These must begin promptly if ordered.42
Jurisdictional Hearing: Step 1
In order to expose the intricacies of California's termination
proceeding, this analysis will divide it into two phases: the jurisdic-
tional or adjudicative hearing and the dispositional hearing. At the
jurisdictional hearing, the court considers whether the child comes
within the court's jurisdiction under the state's juvenile code. 43 At
the jurisdictional stage, the state must make substantial efforts to
improve the home situation and, if possible, return the child to the
parent's custody.44 The state must also prove by a preponderance
of the evidence its allegations concerning the child's neglect.45 If
the allegations are sustained, a dispositional hearing is necessary.
38. The court releases the child from custody unless the state shows prima facie
evidence that the child comes within the applicable termination statute's definition
of neglect. California requires the state to show that
[tihe minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor
will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or
inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or
protect the minor... or by the inability of the parent or guardian to
provide regular care for the minor due to the parent's or guardian's
mental illness, developmental disability." Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 895.
39. Id.
40. Reunification service plans are determined by social service agencies and
used to pave the way to returning a child to the parent's custody. Typically, a parent
receives counseling on parenting skills and visitation rights. A typical "reunification
contract" will condition a parent's reunification with a child on certain requirements
such as: maintaining stable and appropriate housing, acceptable housekeeping, and
a good food supply; undergoing psychological assessment to determine fitness as a
parent; maintaining regular visitation and showing appropriate parenting skills;
participating in a parenting skills program and receiving good reports; and cooperat-
ing with social services. In re Victoria M., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1317, 1322 (Cal. App. 5th
Dist. 1989). Reunification services are a critical intermediate step to a parent
regaining parental rights. See e.g., TuFANY CALLO STORY, supra note 11, at 178.
41. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
42. Id.
43. The jurisdictional requirements are found in the termination statute's
enumeration of substantial, immediate risks to the child. Id.
44. In re Jacobs, 444 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Mich. 1989).
45. Id. at 794 n.12; Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
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Dispositional Hearing: Step 2
At the dispositional hearing, the court determines whether the
state can take the child from the parent's home.46 At this stage, the
court can take one of two routes: it can order the state to provide
support services to preserve the family or it can declare the child a
dependent of the state.4 7 In order to declare the child dependent,
the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child
is in immediate danger and that the state has no choice but to re-
move the child from the parent's custody.48 To make this finding,
the court must consider whether social services made reasonable
efforts to avoid the need to remove the child or whether it was rea-
sonable under the circumstances to fail to do so.4 9 The court must
order reunification services unless it finds clear and convincing evi-
dence that certain factors make them inappropriate.5 0
An important consideration at the dispositional hearing is
that of parental fitness.5 ' Parental fitness refers to the parent's
conduct or culpability prior to the dispositional hearing.5 2 The
state cannot terminate a parental relationship based solely upon
the "best interests of the child" without a showing of parental unfit-
ness. 53 The federal courts have not determined a standard for pa-
rental unfitness. States have variously defined parental unfitness
as "parents who have failed, refused or neglected to provide proper
or necessary care; children who are neglected, deprived, or abused;
children who are in need of supervision;" or a parent's failure "to
maintain contact with the child or to plan for his or her future."5 4
At the end of the dispositional stage, the court decides whether to
reunite the child and parents and order support services or to de-
clare the child a dependent and terminate the relationship. 55
46. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.




51. Courts may consider parental unfitness in addition to the "best interests" of
the child test. CmiLD ABuSE, supra note 22, at 242.
52. A termination statute defines unfit parents according to their conduct and/or
neglect of children prior to state intervention. See Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
903.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 904.
55. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
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Dependent Children in Foster Care
If the court declares the child a dependent of the state, the
state places the child in foster care.56 The state must then periodi-
cally review the child's status.57 According to California's statute,
the court at this first review must order the state to return the child
to the parent's custody unless it finds by a preponderance of evi-
dence that returning the child would create a "substantial risk or
detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the child."58 If
the court makes such a finding, it must consider whether the state
provided reasonable reunification services. 59 Unless it finds by
clear and convincing evidence that such services are inappropriate,
it must order their initiation or continuation.60 At the next review
hearing, the court must again decide between returning the child to
parental custody under a preponderance of the evidence standard
or leaving the child in foster care. 61 At all stages in the process, the
standard of proof is important because it directly affects how rigor-
ously courts will protect parents' rights.
Standards of Proof
Courts apply two standards of proof in termination proceed-
ings. They apply a clear and convincing evidence standard to most
of the required findings. The California statute applies the clear
and convincing standard to the initial finding that the state must
remove a child from parental custody, the determination that rea-
sonable reunification services were provided or were inappropriate,
and the determination that the child is likely to be adopted.62 It
applies the preponderance of evidence standard only when deter-
mining whether a child would incur a substantial risk of harm if
returned to a home that the court already determined to be unfit by
clear and convincing evidence.63
56. Id.
57. CmLD ABUSE, supra note 22, at 241 (stating different programs have begun
requiring regular review.)
58. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 896-97.
62. The asserted rationale for the clear and convincing standard in termination
proceedings is that the clear and convincing standard best impresses the factfinder
with the importance of the decision and consequently, reduces the probability of an
erroneous determination. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-65 (1982). With-
out a precise heightened standard, courts are left to make their own determinations
guided only by open and subjective standards.
63. The rationale is that if a home has been proven unfit by clear and convincing
evidence, the issue of returning the child to his/her parent must be determined
under the lesser standard of preponderance of evidence so that the child does not
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The clear and convincing standard's purpose, according to Cal-
ifornia, is to balance the conflicting interests of the parent and
state.64 The critical interests are: continuing a family relationship,
preserving the integrity and privacy of the family without the
state's intervention, and avoiding the resulting social stigma.65
The child has an interest in a permanent, secure, stable and loving
environment. 66 The state has a critical interest in protecting the
child from harm, abuse, or neglect.67
The clear and convincing proof standard protects the parent
against the court's ability to underweigh probative evidence favor-
ing the parent,68 the state's greater ability to prepare its case, the
state's power to shape the historical events that formed the basis
for termination,69 and a "double jeopardy" defense for parents sub-
ject to repeated state termination efforts.70 Although the burden of
proof is on the state in order to balance the interests of the state
and the parent, the state actually appears to shift this burden to
the physically disabled parent. Once social services begins an in-
vestigation, physically disabled individuals must prove they are fit
parents despite their disability.71
Another obstacle for physically disabled parents has been the
definition of parental "neglect." Courts have defined neglect to in-
clude parents' disability by arguing that neglect is an objective de-
termination that does not require parental culpability.72 This
definition results in discrimination against the physically disabled
"bear a disproportionate share of the risk of an erroneous determination." Heather





68. Id. at 901. One example of ajudge's discretion to underweigh evidence in the
parent's favor is the judge's determination of whether the parent planned for the
child's future - a measure of whether the parent neglected the child. A judge can
reject as "unrealistic" plans that the judge deems overly optimistic based on his/her
own opinion of the parent's physical or financial abilities. A judge can also excuse a
social service agency's lack of efforts to reunite the child and parent by concluding
that this was not in the child's best interest. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 762-63
n.12.
69. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-63. For example, a state got court orders denying
the parents the right to visit their child. The parents were later judged as neglecting
their child because they failed to visit.
70. Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-764.
71. The state has the burden of proof on the issue of why parental custody cannot
be restored, yet in practice parents often must prove their fitness. For example,
physically disabled parents Leigh and William Earl state that they have had an
ongoing affirmative burden of proving their competence since social services began
an investigation of their family. See Pluta, supra note 4.
72. See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 444 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Mich. 1989). See also In re Ster-
ling, 412 N.W.2d 284 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (substance abusing parent); In re B.C.,
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because the objective test has a particularly harsh impact on the
physically disabled. These courts rely on the argument that only
the "objective" test of neglect sufficiently protects children from un-
fit parents.7 3 Other courts, however, have held that parental ne-
glect requires a finding of a parent's culpability and that courts
cannot determine physically disabled parents to be unfit based
solely on their physical disability.74 A better interpretation is to
require culpability regardless of whether a parent is physically dis-
abled.75 By eliminating the culpability requirement and ignoring
the "objective" test of neglect's impact on the physically disabled,
courts have essentially equated physical disability with neglect and
severely jeopardized the disabled parent's rights.76
Although termination statutes vary across jurisdictions, they
share some common characteristics. The statutes use vague lan-
guage to define neglect and parental unfitness, giving courts a
great deal of discretion. States must prove neglect by clear and con-
vincing evidence to terminate parental rights. By equating physi-
cal disability with neglect and not requiring parental culpability for
neglect, courts have discriminated against the physically disabled.
B. Discrimination Against Physically Disabled Parents
In the past, courts have both criticized and perpetuated soci-
ety's stereotypical view of the physically disabled as unfit parents.
Two paradigm cases illustrate the evolving public policy toward the
physically disabled parent. In In re Marriage of Carney,7 7 the court
decided that a father's physical disability was not a sufficient
change of circumstance to require transferring custody of two sons
to his ex-wife. The court balanced the protected right to parent
against concern for the children's best interests. 78 The court recog-
nized society's moral and legal obligation to respect the civil rights
582 A.2d 1196 (D.C. 1990) (parent who lacked contact with child); Matter of Mont-
gomery, 316 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 1984) (mentally disabled and mentally ill parent).
73. See, e.g., Jacobs, 444 N.W.2d at 794. See also In re Sterling, 412 N.W.2d 284
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (substance abusing parent); In re B.C., 582 A.2d 1196 (D.C.
1990) (parent who lacked contact with child); Matter of Montgomery, 316 S.E.2d 246
(N.C. 1984) (mentally disabled and mentally ill parent).
74. See, e.g., In re Tedder, 389 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (parent with
paranoid schizophrenia); In re Bailey, 336 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1983) (mentally dis-
abled parent).
75. Jacobs, 444 N.W.2d 789, 799-800 (Levin, J., dissenting) (physically disabled
parent who sought state assistance determined neglectful and unfit according to the
"objective" test of neglect).
76. Id.
77. 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979).
78. Id. at 37.
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of the physically disabled, including the right to parent.79 There-
fore, the state cannot take away the right on the basis of physical
disability.
Carney was revolutionary because it acknowledged society's
stereotypes of the physically disabled parent.80 The court con-
nected these stereotypes to the underlying restrictive definition of a
parent as solely a physical role and then replaced the traditional
physical definition of parenting with one that captures the "heart of
the parent-child relationship"
its essence lies in the ethical, emotional, and intellectual gui-
dance the parent gives to the child... [I]ts motive power is pa-
rental love and concern for the child's well-being; and its
teachings deal with such fundamental matters as the child's
feelings about himself, his relationships with others, his system
of values, his standards of conduct, and his goals and priorities
in life.8 1
According to Carney, the policy of mainstreaming restrains a
trial judge's discretion in a termination proceeding.82 One goal of
the policy includes allowing the disabled to participate in central
functions of society like parenting.8 3 Carney established the princi-
ple that courts cannot interpret physical disability as prima facie
evidence of parental unfitness.8 4 Rather, they must view the dis-
abled parent as an individual and the family as a whole.8 5 Carney
emphasized the expansive emotional, moral, and intellectual role of
a parent, revealing the court's recognition that the physically dis-
abled can assume a parental role as well as the non-disabled and
may have particular advantages over them.8 6
79. Id. at 41.
80. Id.
81. The Supreme Court of California criticized the trial court's belief that a phys-
ically disabled parent is an unfit parent because of physical limitations. Id. at 41-42.
The trial court believed that the physically disabled father could not have a "normal
relationship" with his sons because they couldn't play sports together such as basball
and fishing. Id. at 42. In addition, Carney dismissed the underlying stereotype that
the parent's disability will disable the child. Id. at 43.
82. Id. at 44.
83. Id. at 44-45. See also supra note 20.
84. The public policy of civil rights for the physically disabled "includ[es] their
right not to be deprived of their children because of their disability." Id. at 37. "No
less important to this policy [mainstreaming] is the integration of the handicapped
into the responsibilities and satisfaction of family life, cornerstone of our social sys-
tem .... [T]he trial courts must avoid impairing or defeating the foregoing public
policy." Id. at 45. (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 42.
86. Id. According to Carney, a physically disabled parent has necessarily gained
the asset of patience and tolerance by coping with his/her disability and society. Id.
at 44.
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Since Carney, courts have retreated from sensitivity to and
recognition of discrimination against the physically disabled par-
ent.87 In re Victoria M. 88 focused on the state's obligation to show
by clear and convincing evidence that it had tried to provide alter-
native support services for the disabled parent.8 9 It held that a
court may terminate parental rights if it has found that terminat-
ing the parent's rights is in the child's best interests and is the least
detrimental alternative. 90 The court reached this last determina-
tion through a two step approach. First it explored all reasonable
alternatives and, second, it weighed the parent's right to preserve
the parent/child relationship against the child's interest in a secure
environment. 91 The court emphasized three principles when re-
quiring the state to meet the heightened clear and convincing stan-
dard of showing that it investigated alternative support services to
keep the child with the parent. These included the state's obliga-
tion to provide assistance to the disabled parent, the importance of
support services to a disabled parent, and the critical distinction
between an unfit parent and a parent who lacks adequate state
assistance.
Many courts have declined to follow Carney's approach and
create new social service programs to assist physically disabled par-
ents. Some courts have viewed an order to create a program that
does not exist as per se unreasonable. 92 Therefore, physically dis-
abled parents have found themselves in situations where they have
been ordered to provide certain services to their children or lose
87. Contra Matter of McDuel, 369 N.W.2d 912 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). McDuel
reiterated Carney by holding that a physical disability such as multiple sclerosis,
which requires the parent to use a wheelchair, cannot be the basis for a determina-
tion of neglect under the termination statute. The McDuel court's view of neglect
required some blameworthy or culpable act by the parent. Since the disabled as a
class are not blameworthy, the court held that physical disability alone could not be
a basis for termination of parental rights. Id. at 916-17.
88. In re Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
89. The Victoria court looked at the surrounding community's resources for the
developmentally disabled and found that specialized services in the form of com-u-
nity regional centers for the developmentally disabled were available but that social
services had not explored or utilized these for the parent. Id. at 504-05.
90. Id. at 506.
91. Id.
92. One case held that a mentally retarded mother was an unfit parent for her
premature baby and that the 24-hour child care assistance that would make her fit
was not required by either the equal protection or the due process clause. In re P.M.,
581 N.E.2d.720, 722 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991). Another court held that a mentally re-
tarded mother's care for her child with cerebral palsy was insufficient without 24-
hour child care assistance; the court further held that the mother had no statutory
right to 24-hour assistance. In re J.A.L., 432 N.W.2d 876, 879 (N.D. 1988).
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them.93 The problem is that these parents have no available means
through which to obtain these services. This results from the
courts' underestimation of the central importance of support serv-
ices to disabled parents.
Weakening the Support Services Requirement
Courts have severely underestimated the effect that the ab-
sence of support services has on the evaluation of a physically dis-
abled parent's fitness. Courts have accepted less than clear and
convincing evidence when evaluating whether the statutory re-
quirement of support services has been met and uncritically relied
on states' arguments that providing support services would be un-
reasonable every time the services are unavailable. In stark con-
trast, courts have rigidly resisted disabled parents' counter-
argument that support services are reasonable when they are the
only way to preserve their family and make them "fit" parents.
Courts have weakened the statutory requirement that states
make support services available to disabled parents by not consist-
ently requiring clear and convincing proof that social services inves-
tigated the family's needs and provided reasonable support services
before the termination hearing. The court in In re Jacobs94 held
that the state provided reasonable services to a temporarily dis-
abled mother who voluntarily sought assistance in caring for her
children.95 The state presented no evidence that it had offered any
services in response to the mother's requests, yet the mother lost
custody of her children solely because her requests triggered a state
investigation and termination hearing.96
Similarly, the court in In re P.A.B.97 ignored the central issue
of whether the state provided reasonable services. The state had
provided social services to a developmentally disabled parent until
93. The typical situation arises when the state requires an attendant to assist
the physically disabled parent with the child yet refuses to provide one. See Ma-
thews, supra note 5, at Z10.
94. 444 N.W.2d 789 (Mich. 1989).
95. Id. at 795. The reviewing court viewed the evidence in the light most
favorable to the respondent, the state, to determine whether reasonable services
were provided. When there is substantial evidence to support the judgment, the
court affirms the trial court's ruling. See In re Misako R., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 220
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
96. The social service agency's only response to the mother's requests was its
offer to return the children to their estranged father who was unable to care for
them. Jacobs, 444 N.W.2d at 791 n.5, 797. The unassisted mother found her own
housing and even found a private attendant who could assist her with her children.
Id. at 802 (Levin, J., dissenting).
97. 570 A.2d 522 (Pa. 1990).
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it unilaterally decided that the services were "insufficient."98 The
court did not require the state to explain why it believed the serv-
ices were "insufficient" or why it changed its evaluation of the situa-
tion during its relationship with the family.99
On the other end of the spectrum, In re Victoria M. applied the
clear and convincing standard and held that the state had not met
its statutory burden when it required a disabled parent to obtain
new housing but did not assist that parent in finding housing.100
Consequently, the court reversed the prior termination of the par-
ent's rights and remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether the state investigated and provided support services. 0 1
Before the ADA's enactment, courts uncritically accepted
states' arguments that services are unreasonable if they are cur-
rently unavailable despite the fact that the lack of the service can
be the only reason a physically disabled parent is considered unfit.
Generally, courts ruled that if a program or service is nonexistent,
the state has no duty to create the service and ordering it to do so
would be unreasonable.102 The rationale is that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not require the state to treat disabled parents dif-
ferently from non-disabled parents by providing a service to
disabled parents which is not also provided to non-disabled par-
ents. 103 The counter-argument is that the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees equal treatment of persons similarly situated and that
physically disabled and non-disabled parents compose the same
class: parents. The state currently treats physically disabled par-
ents differently by not providing an essential service - twenty-four
hour attendant care - to disabled parents. This results in exclud-
ing the physically disabled from the class of parents. Rejecting this
argument, one court labeled the proposal to create a twenty-four
hour attendant care assistance program "extravagant."104 Another
court stated that such a program would serve one parent's "sole
benefit."105
98. Id. at 523.
99. Id.
100. In re Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
101. Id. at 507.
102. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
103. Generally, the disabled do not have constitutional protections distinct from
the non-disabled except in the areas of education and employment. BoNNIE P.
TUCKER AND BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTs OF PERSONS wrrH DISABILITIES: AN
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAw 2:5 (1992). The developmentally disabled have been held
not to be a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause.
104. In re J.A.L., 432 N.W.2d 876, 879 (N.D. 1988).
105. In re P.M., 581 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991). Perhaps the clearest
example of this callous disregard for the physically disabled parent is the judge's
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Courts have attenuated further the requirement of "reason-
able services" by redefining it as "reasonable under the circum-
stances."10 6 The phrase "under the circumstances" allows courts to
examine factors such as the parent's mental condition, the parent's
insight into the family's problems and the parent's willingness to
accept and participate in appropriate services.' 0 7 A "good faith ef-
fort" by social services satisfies this test.'0 8 But courts define social
services' good faith effort by focusing on the parent's conduct. So-
cial service agencies need only "offer" their available services' 0 9
and parents must look after their own legal rights and seek to cor-
rect [their] own behavior to alleviate their parenting problems.110
Courts have ignored the importance of support services and
have simultaneously reinforced the stereotype of the psychologi-
cally unstable, physically disabled parent. The myth that mental
disability coincides with physical disability"' is reflected in the
law. According to federal and state law, for instance, anyone with
cerebral palsy 1 2 is developmentally disabled. 113 This definition is
widely used despite the fact that only one-third of those with cere-
bral palsy have significant intellectual deficiency.11 4 Courts' un-
willingness to order social services for physically disabled parents
reinforces this legal fiction and confuses the physically disabled
with the developmentally disabled.115 As noted below, the psycho-
logical testing of physically disabled parents has further reinforced
this myth.
Psychological Evaluations and the State's Bias Against
Reunification
During the termination process, parents often undergo psy-
chological evaluation to determine their fitness for reunification
statement: "The sad reality is that some are less fortunate than others, so less fortu-
nate that they, through no fault of their own, cannot care for a child." Id.
106. In re Christina L., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 689.
109. See id. at 686-87.
110. See id. at 688-89.
111. See infra note 115, and accompanying text.
112. Cerebral palsy is a collection of possible symptoms such as spasms, involun-
tary muscle movement, unsteadiness, seizures, abnormal sensation and perception,
impaired sight, hearing or speech, and mental retardation. TIFFANY CALLO STORY,
supra note 11, at 32.
113. Id. at 112.
114. Id.
115. Tiffany CaUo was permanently labeled as "mentally retarded" by an incor-
rect report which psychologists who later evaluated her parental fitness relied on.
Id. at 114.
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services and their fitness as parents. 116 The frequent categoriza-
tion of physically disabled parents as developmentally disabled
jeopardizes their chance to regain custody rights. Psychological
evaluations vary depending on whether the psychologist is em-
ployed by the state and whether the psychologist has experience
with the physically disabled.117 In Tiffany Callo's situation, the so-
cial service agency gave her a barrage of psychological tests" l8 and
determined that she suffered from "generalized anxiety, a border-
line personality disorder with narcissistic histrionics and paranoid
traits."119 When her attorney questioned the psychologist about
her knowledge of Callo's disability, cerebral palsy, the psychologist
revealed she had no knowledge of the disability and no insight into
how it might affect responses to the psychological tests.120 A noted
expert on physically disabled parents, Dr. Megan Kirshbaum,1 2 1
evaluated Callo as a communicating and caring parent and testified
that she ought to begin a reunification plan to continue and
strengthen her existing parent/child relationship.122
116. See In re Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); See TF-
FANY CALLO STORY, supra note 11, at 24-26.
117. See McDuel, 369 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). Dr. Kirshbaum, a
national expert on disabled parents, conducted research on 125 disabled parent fam-
ilies and found '"severe problems" with professionals' abilities to accurately assess
disabled parents. TFFANY CALLO STORY, supra note 11, at 239.
118. Callo was given the Million Co-Axial Multivariate Inventory (MCMI), the
Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory (MMPI), the Rorschach, and the Bender tests.
TiFFANY CALLO STORY, supra note 11, at 24.
119. Id. at 24-25. Social services argued that Callo was psychologically and emo-
tionally unfit to receive reunification services and that she posed a threat of possible
neglect or abuse to her sons. Id. at 179.
120. Id. at 182. No research has yet been conducted to determine whether these
frequently used psychological tests measure the mental health of the physically dis-
abled, much less people with cerebral palsy. Id. Nevertheless, this evaluation was a
significant factor in the hearing determining whether to give reunification services
to Callo since the state's principal argument was that Callo was psychologically unfit
to be a parent. Id. at 179. Experts later questioned whether the "emotional" prob-
lem uncovered by the test results was actually an organic result of the disability. Id.
at 188. If so, this would have made the results inconclusive about her psychological
status.
121. Dr. Kirshbaum is the director of the community non-profit organization,
Through the Looking Glass, in Berkeley, California, which provides clinical and sup-
portive services, training, and research to infants, young children, and families in
which one or more members has a disability. Through the Looking Glass has re-
ceived a grant from the National Institute of Disability and Rehabilitation Research
to develop adaptive equipment such as special feeding and diapering enclosures that
would assist parents in wheelchairs. Its mission is to educate professionals and the
disabled themselves that the disabled can fully participate as parents. Telephone
Interview with Dr. Megan Kirshbaum, Director of Through the Looking Glass, (Oct.
2, 1992). See also TwsFANY CAiLO STORY, supra note 11, at 144-145.
122. Dr. Kirschbaum's view was that Callo, with the assistance of a backup at-
tendant, should be allowed to show that she could handle caring for at least one of
her two sons. TFFANY CALO STORY, supra note 11, at 209.
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The psychological evaluations and the reliance on these evalu-
ations reveal a disturbing and dangerous callousness toward the
crisis situation of physically disabled parents. Courts are insensi-
tive to the fact that depression and mood swings are "normal" reac-
tions of a parent fighting to maintain custody rights. These
reactions can be heightened when a physically disabled parent's fit-
ness evaluation may also depend on her ability to lift a child. Agen-
cies often focus on the physical limitations of physically disabled
adults in their fitness evaluations. 123 The discriminatory belief
that physically disabled parents can never be normal parents be-
cause of their physical limitations124 underlies the courts' focus on
physical limitations125 and unwillingness to address the natural,
logical solution: better support services.
This discriminatory belief takes the form of a bias against
reunification and a policy which encourages adoption by non-dis-
abled parents.126 Tiffany Callo confronted bias in the form of her
social worker's constant urgings that she place her child up for
adoption and her unwillingness to respond to Callo's requests for
reunification services. 127 When Callo complained to her social
worker's supervisor about the worker's bias toward adoption, the
supervisor disregarded her complaint and the social worker re-
mained on her case.128 The "unspoken reality" underlying agencies'
action or failure to act is a belief that "more deserving able-bodied
white middle-class infertile couples" should adopt a physically dis-
abled parent's healthy white baby.129 Fortunately, some states
have acted to dispel this prejudicial belief.
Although no state requires social services to create and fund
new programs to assist physically disabled parents,130 several pilot
programs have had success in preserving families and have pro-
duced savings for taxpayers.131 Several states, including California
123. See id. at 114-15 (agency's videotape of Callo diapering her child focuses on
her physical limitations).
124. In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1979) (stating it is impermis-
sible to use a person's physical handicap as prima facie evidence of the person's un-
fitness as a parent or of probable detriment to the child).
125. The court in Tiffany Callo's hearing focused on a videotape that social serv-
ices made of Callo diapering her son. Social services and the court scrutinized the
tape, measuring how long it took Callo to accomplish the task; whereas, Dr. Kirsch-
baum felt that the tape revealed Callo's loving communication with her son. The
court, in contrast, failed to recognize the barriers that social services had erected for
Callo's task. TiFFANY CALLO STORY, supra note 11, at 215-217.
126. See Pluta, supra note 4; Abrams, supra note 4, at E7.
127. Tu'ANw CAi.O STORy, supra note 11, at 111.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 213.
130. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
131. Ti'AANY CALLo STORY, supra note 11, at 242-43.
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and Michigan, have set up pilot projects in which the state spends
part of its foster care money on a variety of well-coordinated serv-
ices to parents in crisis. The programs help parents with problems
ranging from substance abuse to physical disability.132 California's
Santa Clara County reported a $1.72 savings for every dollar spent
on the program.133 The success of these programs in keeping fami-
lies intact emphasizes the unfair and discriminatory treatment
physically disabled parents receive from agencies and courts. The
programs also represent the future of social service programs for
the physically disabled. The ADA has also recognized this future.
The largest costs to taxpayers may come from states' resist-
ance to recognizing that the ADA gives the physically disabled an
equal opportunity to parent.134 A major policy driving the ADA
was the public's desire to get the disabled off public assistance, put
them to work, and save taxpayer-money.135 The arguments of
those who resist recognizing a federal right to support services ig-
nore the social costs of not recognizing a federal right. Failing to do
so perpetuates discrimination and leaves the fundamental parental
right in the hands of social service agencies and courts: the very
groups that have placed this right in jeopardy. This resistance is
foolish because it works against non-disabled society's self-inter-
132. Mathews, supra note 5, at Z12.
133. Id. This savings estimate did not include the court costs saved from keeping
the children out of foster care. Id. The services were tailored to each parent's spe-
cial needs. They ranged from help finding a job or doctor, to providing counselling, to
helping manage a budget. TIFFANY CALLO STORY, supru note 11, at 243.
134. According to a social services spokesperson, the problem is that if social serv-
ices provided 24-hour attendant care, "any parent in trouble would want 24-hour
home care, and we can't afford it." Mathews, supra note 5, at Z12. In fact, consider-
ing the tax savings of several pilot programs in the nation, the proposed 24-hour
attendant program might turn out to be a tax break. See id.
135. The ADA's chances for passage were bolstered by a 1988 Social Secur-
ity Administration study which found that SSA and other social pro-
grams supporting many of the estimated 43 million Americans with
disabilities cost the taxpayers a total of $46.3 billion each year. ADA
proponents argued that this figure would be greatly reduced and local,
state, and federal tax revenues would be greatly increased if people
with disabilities were employed to the fullest extent possible, and if
they had maximum access to public and private facilities where goods
and services are sold.
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., THE AMERIcANs wiTH DiSAaImTIEs ACT 3 (1990)
[hereinafter BNA]. This motive is not surprising because
[miuch of the social treatment of handicapped people depends on the
general society's perceptions of their potential for economic usefulness.
The relationship between the general public and handicapped people
appears to be governed by a concern for cost effectiveness - a concern
that.. .[can] be described as a consequence of political individualism, an
ethic of efficiency, and a doctrine of human capital.
CLAIRE H. LIACHOWrrz, DISABILrr AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 9 (1988).
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est.136 Disability can be one car accident or stroke away. The non-
disabled benefit by recognizing the disabled parent's right to
parent.
Courts have demonstrated that they are ignorant of the bene-
fit support services can confer upon the disabled parent by focusing
on stereotypes of the physically disabled during parental termina-
tion proceedings. These decisions exhibit a belief that the physi-
cally disabled are developmentally disabled, emotionally unstable,
and consequently, unfit parents. The simplicity and success of in-
novative approaches that have allowed families to stay together
and have saved taxpayers' money highlight the discriminatory
treatment physically disabled parents receive in the majority of
jurisdictions.
Part Two: The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities
Act
This section argues that the Americans with Disabilities
Act137 alters the legal rights of physically disabled parents in the
termination proceedings described above. The ADA confers rights
on a protected class of disabled individuals. Parents can claim pro-
tection under the ADA by pointing to its underlying policy and its
implementing regulations. The ADA implicitly mandates that pub-
lic entities such as social service agencies restructure existing pro-
grams and services or create new services to make parenting
equally accessible to the physically disabled and the non-disabled.
It rejects the states' arguments that they do not have a duty to cre-
ate new programs for physically disabled parents that would main-
stream the physically disabled. The ADA recognizes that
discrimination occurs when programs do not exist which would give
the physically disabled an equal opportunity to parent as effectively
as the non-disabled.
My argument consists of two related approaches. First, I ana-
lyze the policy and purposes of the ADA, as revealed in its introduc-
tion and its pertinent titles. I argue that a federal right to modified
and new social service programs giving the physically disabled
equal access to parenting follows naturally from the ADA's policy
objectives. Second, I analyze Title II of the ADA and its implement-
136. "To expect that ablebodied adults can learn to see their own interests in pub-
lic treatment of physically disabled people seems silly and naive on its face - espe-
cially when many adults do not appear to see self-interest in favorable treatment of
aged citizens." LIACHOWITZ, supra note 135, at 112.
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991).
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ing regulations to show that the statutory language directly sup-
ports this federal right.
A. The Background and Legislative History of the ADA
Before the ADA's enactment,138 the Rehabilitation Act of
1973139 was the only civil rights law conferring rights on the dis-
abled. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimina-
tion against any "otherwise qualified individual with handicaps" in
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.140 It
was patterned generally after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and
national origin in federally assisted programs.141 The Rehabilita-
tion Act resulted from failed attempts to include disability discrimi-
nation within the Civil Rights Act.142
The Rehabilitation Act is important to interpreting the ADA
because the ADA incorporates some of Section 504's terminology,
regulations and case law. This connection is strongest in the ADA's
Title II, which concerns public entities.14 3 Both the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA focus on equal opportunity for the disabled and
both require that state and local governments make special accom-
modations or modifications to their policies and practices to achieve
this goal.144
The ADA is a civil rights statute which confers rights on the
protected class of qualified individuals with a disabihty.145 The
need for the ADA was twofold: first, no law existed to prohibit all
private entities from discriminating on the basis of disability,146
138. Prior to analyzing the ADA, I will examine disabilities law in existence
before the ADA's enactment and discuss how the ADA relates to it.
139. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
140. Id. § 794. Section 504 also applies to federal executive agencies and the Pos-
tal Service through the 1978 amendments. BNA, supra note 135, at 33 n. 40.
141. BNA, supra note 135, at 21.
142. Senators Humphrey and Vanik were the leaders of the failed attempt to
amend the Civil Rights Act to include disability discrimination. BNA, supra note
135, at 21.
143. ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE 1 800 (1990).
144. Id.
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182, 12184 (1988). The definition of disability
in the ADA comes from Section 504 of the Rehabilation Act and the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988. ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 143, 1 800.
146. The American Bar Association's Mental and Physical Disabilities Law Re-
porter stated in 1984 that "[t]o date, laws prohibiting discrimination against handi-
capped people have applied only to federal agencies and recipients of federal grants,
contracts, and other forms of federal assistance. Discrimination against handi-
capped persons should be prohibited in all contexts where Congress has seen fit to
outlaw other forms of discrimination." BNA, supra note 135, at 28 (quoting Bergdorf
& Bell, Eliminating Discrimination Against Physically and Mentally Handicapped
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and second, disability discrimination was widespread.147 President
Bush signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990,148 after recogniz-
ing the ADA's overwhelming Congressional support. Iowa Senator
Tom Harkin called the ADA the "Emancipation Proclamation" for
the forty-three million people with disabilities in the United
States.149 Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA applies to enti-
ties, private and public, regardless of whether they receive federal
financial assistance.i50 It bars the commonly recognized forms of
discrimination in "employment, housing, public accommodations,
education, transportation, communication, recreation, institution-
alization, health services, voting and access to public services."' 5 '
The ADA's legislative history reflects the concern of advocates
and activists over the issue of disabled parenting:
The social consequences that have attached to being disabled
often bear no relationship to the physical or mental limitations
imposed by the disability. For example, being paralyzed has
meant far more than being unable to walk - it has meant be-
ing excluded from public school, employment opportunities, and
being deemed an unfit parent.15 2
Throughout the legislative history, disabled individuals ex-
press their overwhelming sense of society's misconceptions about
their disability and hostility toward their becoming truly equal
members of society:
[T]he general public doesn't want to see you doing your laun-
dry, being a caseworker, a shopper, or a Mom. It is difficult to
see yourself as a valuable member of society, and sometimes it
Persons: A Statutory Blueprint, 8 MENT. & PHYs. Dis. LAw RPTR., JanJFeb. 1984, at
64,71).
147. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights wrote in 1983 that "[d]espite some im-
provement, particularly during the last two decades, discrimination against handi-
capped people continues to be a serious and pervasive social problem." BNA, supra
note 135, at 27 (quoting U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE
SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL AmLITIEs 159 (1983)); The disabled have even been de-
scribed by a judge as "the most discriminated [against] minority in our nation. BNA,
supra note 135, at 27.
148. The effective dates for the ADA titles are as follows: Title I, 24 months after
enactment; Titles II and III, 18 months after enactment (effective on Jan. 26, 1992);
Title IV, must be operating in three years. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., AMER-
icANs WITH DISABLrms ACT OF 1990: LAw AND EXPLANATION 10-11 (1990).
149. BNA, supra note 135, at xi.
150. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., supra note 148, at 9.
151. TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 103, at 20:3.
152. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before
the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities and Select Education of the Committee
on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1989) (testimony of Arlene B.
Mayerson) (emphasis added).
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is hard to gee yourself as a person worthy of so much more re-
spect than you get from the general public.153
This legislative history shows that the ADA's drafters and ad-
vocates recognized discrimination against physically disabled par-
ents. Their comments and the statute's construction show that the
ADA creates a federal right to parent.
The Policy and Purposes of the ADA
The ADA's introduction states its policy goals. Congress
designed the ADA to be the solution to society's historical isolation
and segregation of the disabled.154 The ADA's language states that
the proper goals regarding the disabled are eliminating discrimina-
tion and providing the disabled with "equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency."155
The ADA's central objective is to mainstream156 the disabled into
all the functions performed by non-disabled members of society.15 7
By eliminating discrimination, the ADA seeks to grant rights cur-
rently held only by non-disabled citizens. Although it is not explic-
itly mentioned in the ADA, parenting is a central function of society
and a right held by citizens.158
The ADA describes discrimination as including "outright in-
tentional exclusion," physical barriers, "overprotective rules and
policies," "exclusionary qualification standards and criteria," and
"relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or
other opportunities."159 This far-reaching description may include
social service agency policies that label physically disabled parents
as unfit per se.16 0 Importantly, the ADA recognizes both the origin
and consequences of discrimination. The origins are in "stereotypic
assumptions" that do not reflect the individual's ability to partici-
153. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearings on H.R. 4498 Before
the Subcomm. on Select Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 100th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 87 (1988) (testimony of Virginia Domini, Training Coordinator, In-
dependence Unlimited) (emphasis added).
154. In the findings section, Congress found that society has historically tended to
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (Supp.
1991).
155. Id. at (a)(8) and (b)(1).
156. See supra note 20.
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(8)-(9) and (bXl) (Supp. 1991).
158. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(5) (Supp. 1991).
160. This far-reaching definition of discrimination includes the overprotective so-
cial services policy that deems physically disabled parents as per se unfit, by using a
qualification test of a good parent that bars physical disability and that provides
physically disabled parents with fewer services than the agency provides to sub-
stance-abusing parents. Abrams, supra note 4, at El.
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pate in and contribute to society. 16 1 The consequences are "inferior
status"16 2 and "political powerlessness." 163 These consequences ap-
ply to the legal rights of physically disabled parents in termination
proceedings. As a result, the ADA's mainstreaming policy and its
expansive discrimination definition support the idea that a federal
right to support services exists for physically disabled parents.
The ADA's broad coverage provides support for this interpre-
tation. Among the areas covered are employment, public transpor-
tation, public accommodations, and telecommunications.164 This
broad coverage demonstrates a clear agenda to mainstream dis-
abled individuals into central societal functions and roles. The
ADA imposes a duty on public and private entities' 6 5 to reasonably
accommodate the physically disabled.
Title II of the ADA
Title II states that public entities166 have a duty not to dis-
criminate against disabled individuals. Title II defines the extent
of the duty, those protected, essential eligibility requirements for
receiving a benefit or service, the meaning of equal opportunity to a
service, the necessary reasonable modifications social service agen-
cies must provide, and the limits or defenses to a state's duty. This
article will analyze each of these factors and arrive at a composite
of a state's duties. It will argue that a federal right to support serv-
ices falls directly within this duty and that states have no defense
against an individual's efforts to enforce this federal right.
Title II and its implementing regulations' 6 7 prohibit discrimi-
nation against the disabled by state and local governments.168 Ti-
tle II's coverage is broad: "[b]asically everything a state or local
governmental entity does, from providing social services and spon-
soring cultural and recreational events to building facilities and of-
fering job opportunities, must be accessible to disabled
161. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (aX7) (Supp. 1991).
162. Id. at (a)(6).
163. Id. at (a07).
164. See 42 U.S.C. Chapter 126 - table of contents (Supp. 1991).
165. Private entities are covered by Title III - Public Accomodations and Services
Operated by Private Entities.
166. See infra note 168, and accompanying text.
167. The Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice issued regulations to implement Title II on July 26, 1991, under the
authority granted in 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a). The regulations became effective on Jan-
uary 26, 1992. 28 C.F.R. § 35 (1992).
168. Title 11 applies to "public entities." A public entity is defined as any state or
local government; any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instru-
mentality of a state or states or local government; and the National Railroad Passen-
ger Corporation, and any commuter authority. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (Supp. 1991).
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individuals." 169 Title II's regulations explicity state that its nondis-
crimination provisions apply to social services.170 The purpose of
Title II is to "continue to break down barriers to the integrated par-
ticipation of people with disabilities in all aspects of community
life ."171
B. Who the ADA Protects
Title II protects anyone who is a "qualified individual with a
disability."172 This includes an individual who has a physical or
mental impairment substantially limiting one or more major life ac-
tivities, who has a record of such an impairment, or who is regarded
as having such an impairment.17a This definition covers individu-
als with cerebral palsy, like Tiffany Callo, and those with tempo-
rary disabilities, like those from a stroke or car accident.174 Title II
protects individuals who "with or without reasonable modifications
to rules, policies, or practices .. . meet the essential eligibility re-
quirements" to participate in a program or receive services offered
by a public entity.175 If a disabled individual fails to satisfy the
eligibility requirements for receiving a service, the state has a duty
to determine whether a reasonable accommodation would enable
the individual to satisfy the requirements. 176
This approach reveals a critical policy: a person's qualification
to receive a benefit or service cannot depend exclusively on the way
"things have always been done" by the state.177 A state must
change in order to meet the statute's requirement. A disabled indi-
vidual's ability to participate depends on "the 'essential' goals and
objectives of a [service or program], not only on how such [programs
and services] were structured and performed in the past. Due con-
sideration must be given to alternative methods for achieving the
'essential' elements that would facilitate the participation of the in-
169. ADA COMPLIANcE GUIDE, supra note 143, T 810 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 800.
171. BNA, supra note 135, at 251 (emphasis added) (quoting the House Judiciary
Comm. Report).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. 1991).
173. This definition is provided in the implementing regulations. 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.104 (1992). The ADA states: "The term 'qualified individual with a disability'
means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications
to rules, policies, or practices,... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public
entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2) (Supp. 1991).
174. ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 143, app. III at 155 (stating that im-
pairments are not necessarily excluded because they are temporary).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2) (Supp. 1991).
176. BNA, supra note 135, at 109.
177. Id. at 109-110.
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dividual with a disability."'178 Title II includes the "essential eligi-
bility" test which the Supreme Court defined in School Board of
Nassau County, Florida v. Arline.179
In Arline, the Court balanced the interests of the disabled
against legitimate public safety concerns and indicated that public
entities may consider safety factors in determining whether a dis-
abled individual is qualified for employment.180 As a result, if a
safety threat to third persons arises, the state has a direct threat
defense against the application of Title II's requirements.' 8 ' Title
II allows states to exclude individuals from participating in or re-
ceiving its services if the individual poses a direct threat to the
health or safety of others.' 8 2 A "direct threat" is a significant risk
to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by modi-
fying policies and practices or providing auxiliary aids or
services. 18 3
Importantly, the direct threat test establishes that courts can-
not base a determination of a direct threat on generalizations or
stereotypes about a particular disability.184 Rather, courts must
perform an individualized, fact-based determination from medical
information or the "best available objective evidence."' 8 5 These
strict requirements for the state's direct threat defense "[protect]
disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereo-
types, or unfounded fear."' 8 6
Although the "qualified individual with a disability" standard
described above only addresses the state's duty of providing ex-
isting, already available services, the standard is crucial under the
ADA for three reasons. First, Congress knew of the Arline decision
178. Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 109. In Arline, the Court ruled that a person with a communicable
disease is an individual with a handicap under Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987). The eligibility test outlined by the Court is an indi-
vidualized two-part inquiry: 1) whether an individual meets all of a program's re-
quirments, and 2) if the individual does not meet all requirements, whether a
reasonable accommodation would enable the individual to meet all requirements.
Id. at 287-89.
180. Id. at 288.




185. The direct threat determination "must be based on an individualized assess-
ment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical evidence or on
the best available objective evidence, to determine: the nature, duration, and sever-
ity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and




when it considered enacting a direct threat defense. It is reason-
able to believe that Congress approved the reasonable accommoda-
tion policy regarding disabled individuals' needs and rejected a
direct threat defense based on stereotypes of the capabilities of the
disabled. In termination proceedings, the state uses such stereo-
types when it assumes that a physically disabled parent is physi-
cally and emotionally unstable and will threaten a child's safety.'8 7
The direct threat standard requires evidence that a physically dis-
abled parent actually threatens a child's safety; society's unfounded
belief that a child is unable to adapt to a parent's disabilityZSS is
insufficient to establish a direct threat. Second, the "qualified"
standard recognizes the specific form of discrimination against the
physically disabled in termination proceedings - the bias for adop-
tion and against reunification services.' 8 9 The "qualified individ-
ual" standard directs that the "essential goals" of a service or
program are critical to determining whether the individual will re-
ceive the service.' 90 Because an essential goal of social services is
family preservation, the state has a duty to investigate services
such as reunification which will achieve that goal. Third, the "qual-
ified individual" test exposes the problem that courts have only rec-
ognized a state's duty to provide existing or available services. The
Title II regulations which I will next analyze resolve this problem
by requiring that states create new services. Together, the statute
and the regulations create the law that states must follow when
providing social services.
C. Title 11 Regulations: Equal Opportunity and
Reasonable Modifications
Title II's regulations define the state's duty to create new serv-
ices that provide the disabled with equal opportunity to public serv-
ices, integration, and reasonable modifications.191 This equal
opportunity provision expands Title II's definition of discrimination
and is therefore important. Discrimination, as stated previously,
occurs when a state denies a disabled individual an existing benefit
or service based upon discriminatory eligibility requirements. The
regulatory definition of discrimination includes a situation where a
disabled individual receives services which are not as effective as
187. See supra text accompanying notes 111-115.
188. Dr. Kirshbaum's research has in fact shown that children of physically dis-
abled parents can adapt their behavior to the parent's disability as very young ba-
bies. TwFANY CALLo SToRy, supra note 11, at 200-201.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 127-129.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 177-179.
191. ADA COMPLANCE GUIDE, supra note 143, app.III, at 151.
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those that others receive. 192 Specifically, the state must provide
services that are "as effective in affording equal opportunity to ob-
tain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same
level of achievement as that provided to others."'198 This is a dis-
criminatory effects test that does not require the state to intend to
discriminate in order to provide relief to the victim of discrimina-
tion.194 This test allows physically disabled parents to show they
do not obtain the same result as non-disabled parents. If physically
disabled parents do not receive twenty-four hour assistance and the
result is that they cannot parent as well as non-disabled parents,
then the state's failure to provide these services falls under Title
II's definition of discrimination.
The regulations establish an affirmative duty to create new
services to effectuate the central goal of equal opportunity: a state
may not provide different or separate services to disabled individu-
als than it provides to the non-disabled "unless such action is neces-
sary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities ... services
that are as effective as those provided to others."'195 This provision
requires states to provide twenty-four hour assistance services be-
cause these services are "necessary" to give the physically disabled
an equal opportunity to parent.
The state's failure to provide this service is a form of segrega-
tion prohibited under the equal opportunity provision of Title 1I.196
Without these services, physically disabled parents are separated
from the act of parenting and, most importantly, their children. Ti-
tle I's mandate of integration requires that states create this ser-
vice for physically disabled parents. The key objective underlying
integration is allowing disabled individuals to enter the main-
stream of society;197 integration enables the disabled to interact
with the non-disabled. The only way to effectuate the integration
policy for physically disabled parents is for states to provide them
with a new, supplemental service that allows them to interact with
their non-disabled children. Without this service, the state is dis-
192. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii) (1992).
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. In contrast, the discriminatory effects/impact test of Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976), requires the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent.
195. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (1992) (emphasis added). Further support for the
contention that Congress intended to allow separate programs for the disabled is
that Congress included authority for separate programs in Title III of the ADA. Sec-
tion 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) of Title III provides for separate benefits in language that is
similar to Title II's regulation. Also, section 12182(b)(1XB) of Title III shares the
. most integrated setting appropriate" requirement with Title II's regulation, 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(dX1992).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. 1991).
197. ADA CoMPLIANcE GUIDE, supra note 143, app.III at 159.
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criminating on the basis of disability by splitting up families
headed by disabled individuals.
Title II specifically recognizes that discrimination may occur
when states apply "nonessential policies and practices that are neu-
tral on their face, but deny individuals with disabilities an effective
opportunity" to participate in or receive benefits from a program.198
The traditional social service policy of not providing twenty-four
hour assistant care is a nonessential policy that defeats and "sub-
stantially impair[s] [the] accomplishment of the objectives of the
public entity's program (equal opportunity) with respect to individ-
uals with disabilities."19 9 Social services' central goal should be to
preserve families, and its mandated goal under the ADA is to main-
stream the disabled into non-disabled society.
Title ii imposes a duty on states to create support services for
the disabled not only through its central goal of equal opportunity
but also through its requirement that states make reasonable modi-
fications to their existing programs.2 00 The policy behind reason-
able modifications supports the duty of social service agencies to
structure their programs to the physically disabled's needs:
Discrimination against handicapped people cannot be elimi-
nated if programs, activities, and tasks are always structured
in the ways people with 'normal' physical and mental abilities
customarily undertake them. Adjustments or modification of
opportunities to permit handicapped people to participate fully
have been broadly termed 'reasonable accommodation.' 2 0 1
States must "make reasonable modifications in policies, practices,
or procedures ... where necessary" to avoid discriminating on the
basis of disability.202
The ADA defines "reasonable modifications" broadly. The
ADA does not explicitly define "reasonable modifications." Rather,
it states the "reasonable modification" duty as a general rule that is
198. Id. at 160.
199. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(37)(iiX1992), ADA COMPLLANCE GUIDE, supra note 143,
app.III at 176.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2XSupp. 1991). Title II and Title III (public accommoda-
tions) requirement of "reasonable modifications" is similar to Title I's (employment)
requirement of "reasonable accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5) (Supp. 1991).
The Supreme Court has used the terms interchangeably. BNA, supra note 135, at
115.
201. BNA, supra note 135, at 114, (quoting the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights'
report Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities).
202. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(7) (1991). Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) of Title III (Public
Accommodations) of the ADA sets out the requirement specifically for public accom-
modations and the House Judiciary Committee Report directs the Attorney General
to include these specific requirements in the Title II regulation. ADA COMPLIANCE
GUIDE, supra note 143, app.III at 161.
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subject to certain exceptions. 203 Although the ADA does not explic-
itly define "reasonable modifications," it provides several illustra-
tions of what is "reasonable". Title II's list is broad and includes
redesigning equipment, reassigning services to an accessible build-
ing, altering existing facilities, constructing new facilities, as-
signing aides, and making home visits.204 Under Title II,
"reasonable" may be restructuring a job, modifying a work sched-
ule, acquiring or modifying equipment, and providing qualified
readers or interpreters. 205 Title II's requirement that states pro-
vide the disabled with such auxiliary aids and services as are neces-
sary for their effective communication 206 emphasizes that the
disabled are best qualified to define "reasonable." According to Ti-
tle II, a disabled individual may request a particular aid or service,
and the state must satisfy this request unless it can prove that an
alternative, equally effective service is available or that it. has one
of the defenses that the ADA recognizes. 207
D. The State's Defenses
1. Undue Burden/Fundamental Alteration
The states faced with altering social service programs or creat-
ing twenty-four hour attendant care programs will respond by argu-
ing that this is not required by the ADA. Their defenses under the
statute are that the change would be an undue burden, that it
would fundamentally alter the nature of social services, and that
alternative equally effective services are available.
The ADA does not require a state to take any action that
would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of its ser-
vice, program, or activity or an undue financial or administrative
burdens.208 The state, however, has the burden of proof for these
defenses. 209 A new service presents an undue burden only when
the state shows that it investigated all available funding and could
not provide the service because it would require additional financial
resources that were unavailable. 210 Evidence shows, however, that
a twenty-four hour assistant care service could produce cost-sav-
203. Reasonable modifications are to be made unless they "would fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program, or activity" 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)( 1992).
204. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (b)(1)(1992).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(Supp. 1991).
206. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1)(1992); ADA COMPLiANCE GUIDE, supra note 143,
app.III at 169.
207. ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 143, app.III at 169.
208. 28 C.F.R. 335.164 (1992), however 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (bX2)(1992) asserts
that states must give "primary consideration" to the specific requests of the disabled.
209. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1992).
210. See ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 143, app.III at 166.
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ings, not a financial burden. The successful pilot programs de-
scribed earlier produced a tax-savings compared to the expensive
current foster care system.2 1 In fact, social service agencies have
never investigated the cost-benefits of the new program because the
courts and legislatures have never recognized social services' duty
to create these programs.
Another defense could be that a modification will fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the program it provides to the commu-
nity.212 By creating a new program of attendant care to physically
disabled parents, the state would be fundamentally altering the
services it has provided to physically disabled parents in the past.
However, an alteration that improves social services to bring it in
line with its goal of family preservation would hardly be a detri-
ment to the agency or its clients.
2. Alternatives to Achieving Equal Opportunity
Contrary to courts' views, twenty-four hour attendant care for
the physically disabled is not a unique or radical concept. Under
workers' compensation, it is considered a reasonable service for the
disabled. For example, workers' compensation reimburses employ-
ees or their survivors for their disabilities, medical costs, and some-
times, rehabilitation costs that they incur as a result of job-related
physical or mental injuries. 21 3 In most U.S. jurisdictions, agencies
administer and resolve employees' workers' compensation
claims. 21 4 In every jurisdiction, except for the Virgin Islands, the
medical coverage is unlimited and consists of a wide variety of serv-
ices, including home attendant care.2 15 Courts have widely recog-
nized the duty to provide nursing and attendant care. 2 16 They
broadly define this duty to include twenty-four hour attendant
care.21 7 One court stated there is a duty to furnish "reasonably nec-
essary medical services."21 8 Some courts have held that the duty
211. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
212. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1992); ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 143,
app.III at 178.
213. JEFFREY V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKER'S COMPENSATION 1 (1989).
214. Id. at 73. Only five states have court-administered workers' compensation:
Alabama, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Id.
215. Id. at 57.
216. Interchange Village v. Clark, 363 S.E.2d 350, 352 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Larson
v. Squire Shops, Inc., 742 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Mont. 1987); Quinn v. Archbishop Bergan
Mercy Hosp., 439 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Neb. 1989).
217. Hunter v. Hernando County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 578 So.2d 798,799 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Hopson v. Hickman, 357 S.E.2d 280, 283 (Ga. App. 1987); St.
Clair v. County of Grant, 797 P.2d 993, 1003 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
218. St. Clair, 797 P.2d at 998.
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also applies when a family member or spouse is the attendant.2 19
Courts liberally construe workers' compensation statutes in favor of
the disabled beneficiary. 22 0 This accommodating approach con-
trasts sharply with courts' rejection of the states' duty to provide
twenty-four hour attendant care for physically disabled parents.2 2 1
Title II's regulations expressly mention that a state is not re-
quired "to provide attendant care . . . except in special circum-
stances, such as when the individual is an inmate of a custodial or
correctional institution."22 2 This statement, however, can be recon-
ciled with a state's duty to create the service of attendant care by its
own qualification, "except in special circumstances," and by the fact
that the state may provide special benefits to a particular class of
the disabled.223 The Justice Department's exception for prison in-
mates ought to be extended to parents because they also have no
recourse without this public service. The plight of unassisted phys-
ically disabled parents is defined as such a special circumstance by
the ADA's mandate that the state has an affirmative duty to give
the disabled an equal opportunity to participate in the central func-
tions of the community. Creating an attendant care program for
physically disabled parents is the only means of achieving equal op-
portunity access to parenting.
Conclusion
Deficient state support policies and an insensitive court sys-
tem discriminate against physically disabled parents. Together, so-
cial services and the courts have labeled these parents as unfit and
ignored the logical solution to the purely physical difficulties of dis-
abled parenting: attendant care assistance. The ADA rectifies this
situation by recognizing that disabled individuals have a federal
right to the support services that will give them an equal opportu-
nity to parent. Until this ADA provision is enforced, states will con-
tinue to take away the children of low-income physically disabled
parents like Tiffany Callo who love and want to raise their children.
219. See, e.g., Hunter, 578 So.2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); St. Clair, 797 P.2d
993 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
220. NACKLEY, supra note 213, at 8.
221. See supra note 92.
222. ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 143, app.III at 161.
223. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(c) (1992); see also ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note
143, app.III at 161.

